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‘D is for Dangerous’: devolution and the ongoing decline of 




The notion that Northern England represents – or may represent – a ‘powerhouse’ within the 
British economy clearly connotes the North’s industrial past, as well as intimating an 
industrial renaissance in the not-too-distant future. But now for the bad news: connotations 
and intimations are probably as good as it is going to get. There would appear to be very few 
reasons to believe that the Northern Powerhouse agenda, as promulgated by then Chancellor 
of the Exchequer George Osborne, foretold the kind of radical shift in economic statecraft 
that would in all likelihood be required to transform the prospects for manufacturing 
industries in the North (and indeed elsewhere in the UK). This is despite the clear resonance 
between the possibility of a manufacturing resurgence and the wider economic ‘rebalancing’ 
agenda, which new Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May appears to have revived 
despite initially distancing her government from the Northern Powerhouse moniker. Most 
obviously, ‘imbalances’ between Northern and Southern England, and manufacturing and 
financial services industries, are identified as key dimensions of the UK’s economic malaise. 
The discourse around rebalancing has also repeatedly cited imbalances between exports and 
imports, and investment and consumption – both of which imply that manufacturing (and 
therefore the North, at least to some extent) will be more important to the UK’s economic 
future than it has been to the recent past. Devolution – to Northern city-regions, although not 
exclusively so – has been presented as part of the solution to these problems. Yet it seems the 
content of the devolution ‘deals’ agreed between central and local government since 2010 (as 
well as the ways in which the Conservatives have paradoxically sought to strengthen central 
government) reinforces industrial policy traditions which have served to marginalise 
manufacturing within the UK political economy. 
This chapter considers recent policy practice in these areas – emanating from both the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government of 2010-2015 and the Conservative 
majority government of 2015 onwards – in historical context, in terms of both industrial 
policy traditions and trends in manufacturing performance in the UK. It is organised around 
‘the three Ds’ of manufacturing decline in Northern England. The chapter looks first at 
deindustrialisation and its implications for economic activity in the North, including the more 
recent consequences of the financial crisis and ‘Brexit’, that is, the UK’s withdrawal from the 
European Union (EU). It then looks more closely at the devolution agenda as a dimension of 
industrial policy and economic statecraft more generally. Finally, the chapter reflects on the 
notion of economic development in relation to manufacturing in Northern England, 
advancing a specific argument about the de-development of the Northern economy (which 
has been reinforced by Brexit). The third section therefore seeks to situate what is happening 
in and to the North within a broader understanding of capitalism and uneven development, 
suggesting that Northern England is largely absent from a refurbished global capitalist ‘core’, 
and instead largely resides in the periphery or semi-periphery of the global economic order. 
The North’s more peripheral status may in fact create new opportunities for growth, but on 
subservient terms, and accompanied by greater inequality within the North.  
 
Deindustrialisation and the North/South divide 
 
Manufacturing and economic decline 
 
By any measure, the UK’s manufacturing sector has been experiencing a long-run decline. 
Arguably, decline has been relative rather than absolute, insofar as manufacturing output 
continued to grow in the UK even as it grew (much) faster elsewhere, particularly in 
Germany, Japan and the United States from the mid-late nineteenth century to the early-mid 
twentieth century. However, it is clear that from at least the Second World War onwards, 
manufacturing output growth has noticeably slowed in the UK. This began to translate from 
the 1970s onwards into enormous job losses, especially under the Margaret Thatcher and 
Tony Blair governments, as the UK economy in general dipped several times into recession, 
and manufacturing industries in particular began to face competition from non-OECD 
countries (Froud et al, 2011; Matthews, 2007). There has of course been no single moment of 
crisis within UK manufacturing throughout this period, and generally speaking the value of 
manufacturing output has remained constant in recent decades even as manufacturing 
employment has plummeted, and the share of manufacturing within the UK’s overall 
economic output has shrunk (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014). This may help to explain why 
UK policy elites have been relatively indifferent to manufacturing decline – yet their 
complacency is misplaced. 
That said, manufacturing does feature, albeit sometimes only implicitly, in some of the 
main ‘declinist’ accounts that have been uphold by UK elites at various times, which focus 
primarily on how the UK’s economic decline in relative terms had reduced its influence on 
world affairs in absolute terms. In these accounts, decline is said to be a product of the failure 
of the UK’s ‘gentlemanly’ economic culture (and/or the absence of a bourgeois revolution) to 
instil an entrepreneurial flair among nouveau-riche industrialists, or of how the success of the 
UK’s industrial revolution – propelled by the access to natural resources and consumer 
markets enabled by British imperialism, as well as technological ingenuity – led to 
complacency among elites regarding the construction of a continental-style developmental 
state (English & Kenny, 2000; Gamble, 2000). It was, however, the more critically-focused 
decline theorists, however, who focused most directly on the ailments of manufacturing in the 
UK, with scholars such as Geoffrey Ingham and Karel Williams identifying the nature and 
role (and political power) of the finance sector in both starving the manufacturing sector of 
capital, but also, crucially, instilling among manufacturers a short-termist business model that 
made industry unusually vulnerable to overseas competition (Ingham, 1984; Williams et al, 
1983).  
However, the 1970s ‘stagflation’ crisis undermined the notion of an activist, 
manufacturing-centred industrial policy, even if it had never really been tried in the UK (as 
discussed further below). The most influential decline account, offered by W.D. Rubinstein 
(1993) – one to which Margaret Thatcher adhered – identified the same circumstances as 
Ingham and Williams, but reached the opposite conclusions. The finance sector, in this 
account, was not holding UK industry back; rather, the finance sector is UK industry, and 
should be protected and promoted as the UK’s key industrial speciality. This is one of the 
reasons that the Thatcher government sought to maintain a high value of sterling: making the 
City of London more attractive, but manufacturing exports less attractive. There is of course 
little doubt that declinism abated in the 1990s as a finance-led growth model appeared to be 
responsible for delivering sustained economic growth (and tax revenues which enabled high 
levels of public sector investment under the Blair government). The development of the 
European single market probably helped in this regard, in terms of providing consumers for 
financial services exports, and indeed in helping to sustain (but not necessarily revive) some 
manufacturing industries. 
The 2008 crisis problematised this model, and led to greater elite-level attention on some 
of the problems that tend to mount when ostensibly highly developed economies see their 
manufacturing base shrink. Firstly, insofar as a smaller manufacturing base made the UK 
more dependent on finance, the country was seemingly afflicted by ‘the finance curse’ 
whereby productive activity is handicapped by financial rent extraction, and the growth path 
mirrors the inherent volatility of the finance sector (Christensen et al, 2016). Secondly, the 
UK’s current account balance deteriorated significantly during this period, reaching a deficit 
of around £15 billion (3.5 per cent of GDP) by 2008 with a trade deficit of around £13 
billion, resulting from a decline in manufacturing exports, the main culprit (Office for 
National Statistics, 2016a; see also Rowthorn & Coutts, 2013). Thirdly, manufacturing’s 
demise is the central explanation for the UK’s productivity problem, insofar as manufacturing 
is at root the application of technology to natural resources, and therefore the motor of 
innovation within capitalist economies (irrespective of how the manufacturing sector is 
categorised statistically) (Chang, 2014: 256-267). 
 
The economic geography of deindustrialisation 
 
Manufacturing decline clearly has an impact on the UK economy at the aggregate level. Yet 
its impact has not been felt evenly across the country. The concentration of manufacturing in 
Northern England is perhaps the most important explanation for elite indifference to 
manufacturing decline – which might be characterised more cynically therefore as complicity 
rather than, as suggested above, merely complacency. Although manufacturing output has 
traditionally been fairly even spread across UK regions since the 1970s, the sector has clearly 
been a more important part of some regional economies than others. As late as 1997, 
manufacturing represented around 25 per cent of regional GVA for the North East, 24 per 
cent for the North West, and 24 per cent for Yorkshire and Humberside. The proportion was 
comparable in Wales, slightly higher for the Midlands regions, but significantly lower for 
Southern regions (only 7 per cent in London) and Scotland. A similar pattern is evident for 
2014 (the latest available data), although the gap between the Northern regions (the share of 
manufacturing is 15-16 per cent in all three regions) and the East and the South West has 
narrowed, while grown significantly larger between the Northern regions and London and the 
South East (Office for National Statistics, 2015). 
An important caveat to the notion of manufacturing decline is that it is not unique to the 
UK. Deindustrialisation, which Andy Pike defines as ‘the contraction and rationalisation of 
manufacturing industry’ (Pike, 2009: 51), is a process common to the vast majority of 
advanced capitalist economies, and indeed is often seen as a hallmark of development rather 
than an economic problem or dilemma. However, as suggested above, it has certainly been 
steeper in the UK than most, or indeed all, comparable countries (Rowthorn & Coutts, 2013). 
Moreover, it is important to be clear about the precise implications of deindustrialisation; 
crucially, it acquires most meaning in relation to particular local economies, invariably 
described as ‘deindustrialised regions’. Deindustrialisation typically refers to declining 
manufacturing employment; this usually accompanies a lower share of manufacturing within 
overall output, but not necessarily. It certainly does not mean that manufacturing output 
declines in absolute terms, as the process is generally characterised by a shift towards higher-
value, capital-intense manufacturing industries, with lower-value, labour-intense industries 
migrating to ‘newly industrialising countries’ as part of the proliferation of transnational 
production networks. 
As such, it is from the UK’s apparent embrace of a ‘post-industrial’ economy, largely 
eschewing the opportunity to move towards higher-value manufacturing in place of mass 
industry, that deindustrialisation acquires most meaning in the UK context. While some 
Northern cities have, eventually, developed economies that might broadly be conceived as 
post-industrial – obviously, services sector employment has grown in all parts of the UK in 
both relative and absolute terms – many places remain scarred by the loss of manufacturing 
(Hudson, 2013). Employment rates and earnings have invariably been significantly lower in 
the Northern regions (and, generally speaking, the Midlands) than in the South as a result 
(although it is worth noting that earnings in London and the South East have surged ahead of 
the rest of the South in the last 10-15 years) (Office for National Statistics, 2016c). While the 
picture is inevitably complex, geographers such as Danny Dorling (2010) have argued 
persistently and persuasively that the so-called North/South divide in England is therefore 
widening rather than narrowing, as embodied in differing outcomes for deprivation and life 
expectancy, as well as the labour market, across the divide. Interestingly, Dorling has of 
course always included the Midlands within the divide, rather than conveniently leaving these 
regions out of the overly parsimonious North/South framework. He generally argues that a 
jagged, diagonal line from Gloucester in the West to Grimsby in the East marks the border 
between North and South in England, in terms of understanding geographical inequalities.  
There are of course Northern cities which buck these trends – York, for instance, 
consistently scores highly on the measures deployed by Dorling and others (it is of course not 
a coincidence that York’s economy was never as heavily industrialised as most other local 
economies in the North). Furthermore, Manchester is often lauded as a post-industrial success 
story, but perhaps serves as an ideal reminder that the apparent success of some Northern 
cities in adapting to the services economy has not eradicated problems associated with 
deprivation. The City of Manchester is among the local authority areas with the highest 
deprivation problem, with 40 per cent of its wards in the most deprived decile of wards across 
England (Bullen, 2015). The volume City of Revolution, edited by Jamie Peck and Kevin 
Ward, on the post-industrial ‘restructuring’ of Greater Manchester offers an illuminating 
account in this regard. Peter Dicken (2002) charts Manchester’s transition ‘from globaliser to 
globalised’, noting its subservient role in global production networks that it once sat at the 
apex of, and the coalescence of prosperity and vulnerability. Benito Giordano and Laura 
Twomey (2002) identify an ‘intractable’ joblessness result as one of the consequences, as the 
‘hype’ around post-industrial growth is challenged through evidence of the ephemerality of 
high-value services industries in Manchester since the 1970s, and Dean Herd and Terry 
Patterson (2002) note the failure of recent welfare-to-work programmes to address the 
structural sources of such problems. Rosemary Mellor charts the development of 
Manchester’s city centre, noting ‘the scale of the poverty-belt enveloping the urban 
playground’ (2002: 217). Manchester’s poor are both more dependent on the city centre as 
inner city neighbourhoods decay, and more excluded from it. Nevertheless, more recent work 
by Ward, with others, demonstrates the extent to which Manchester is seen as an exemplar of 
city-regional governance – and indeed the extent to which its own leaders have carefully 
cultivated this ‘mythic’ image (Haughton et al, 2016; see also the chapter by Blakeley and 
Evans in this volume). 
This story is not – or is no longer – unique to Manchester, as the contradictory dynamics 
of post-industrialism have been evident in many parts of the North to a greater or lesser 
extent, and indeed other parts of the UK. Many parts of Southern England, especially parts of 
the Greater London area, were also of course dependent on manufacturing, even if the 
regional economy was overall more diverse. Yet these economies have been more able to 
build upon their diversity to grow financial services and other knowledge-intense service 
industries, and indeed retain and grow some high-value manufacturing industries such as 
pharmaceuticals and computing which are heavily intertwined with higher education 
institutions in the South East, in part due to their proximity to London (Elledge, 2016; Pike, 
2009: 54). Peck’s work, with Nik Theodore, on ‘variegated capitalism’ provides an important 
step towards understanding such dynamics. For Peck and Theodore (2007), the process of 
capitalist restructuring – essentially, the opening of new sites of globally chained production 
as the West deindustrialises – is both spatially bound, emerging from and relying upon 
specific economic geographies (such as the City of London’s global role) and exhibits 
common underlying logics, as large cities within the West develop new relationships with 
each other and the industrialising semi-periphery.  
We can perhaps think of such shifts as emblematic of the regrouping of the core within the 
global capitalist economy, a process known more innocently as ‘globalisation’, whereby 
cities demonstrating leadership in knowledge-intense industries become increasingly 
interconnected (with connections spreading into elite cities within the so-called developing 
world) while becoming partially detached from their domestic political and economic 
environment. Yet we must not forget that post-industrialism is a British story as well as a 
global story. Variegated capitalism may have served as a useful rejoinder to the 
methodological nationalism inherent in Peter Hall and David Soskice’s (2001) ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ thesis, but the condition of Northern England is evidently a product of a very 
British variety of deindustrialisation (see Pike, 2009). The need to eschew methodological 
nationalism need not simultaneously require us to overlook the abiding force of industrial 
practices reinforced by national-level institutions. The varieties of capitalism literature is also 
useful (as Peck and Theodore acknowledge) insofar it emphasises the role of institutional and 
evolutionary dynamics in explaining political-economic outcomes – an analytical approach 
embraced by Ray Hudson (2005), for instance, in accounting for the particularities of 
Northern demise.  
 
The impact of the 2008 crisis 
 
It would be incorrect to presume that 2008 represented a significant rupture within the 
manufacturing sector in the UK, as it did for the rest of the economy – because 
manufacturing had not shared in the pre-crisis boom. Unlike other sectors, there had been no 
upturn in manufacturing output between 2002 and 2007, and stagnation in manufacturing pay 
helped to hold back general earnings growth even as the economy soared (Berry, 2015a; 
Froud et al., 2011). The impact of the recession on manufacturing output was of course 
significant: output in manufacturing remains more than 6 per cent below its pre-crisis peak in 
2007, and around half a million jobs have been lost in the sector (Office for National 
Statistics, 2016b). This helps to explain how output per head has fallen across the Northern 
regions since 2008, while rising elsewhere, particularly London and the South East (Berry 
and Hay, 2016, pp. 4-5). Interestingly, however, job losses in manufacturing have been 
comparable to those in other regions. The North East, North West and Yorkshire and 
Humberside have experienced, respectively, a 13 per cent, 11 per cent and 6 per cent decline 
in manufacturing employment since their pre-crisis peaks, yet these figures are lower than a 
decline of 18 per cent in London, 19 per cent in the South East, and comparable to the East of 
England (12 per cent), the South West (10 per cent), East Midlands (10 per cent) and West 
Midlands (8 per cent) (Office for National Statistics, 2016d). 
As such, we can perhaps conclude that the 2008 crisis has not had a disproportionate 
impact on manufacturing in the North in any direct sense, notwithstanding the greater 
reliance of Northern regions on manufacturing employment. The issue is more one of the 
North’s ability to adapt to such shocks, and whether greater barriers to developing a 
genuinely post-industrial economy in the North means its development will be held back by 
the non-reversal of manufacturing decline. It seems likely, however, that Brexit will have a 
more direct, targeted impact on manufacturing in the North, insofar as exporting 
manufactured goods to Europe (as opposed to selling to the rest of the world, or to domestic 
customers) is more central to the business model of manufacturers in the North (Berry et al, 
2016). Moreover, the products of the industries to which the EU imposes the highest tariffs – 
generally speaking, cars and chemicals – are significantly more likely to be located in the 
North and the Midlands, particularly the North East. Conventional wisdom suggests that the 
enormous fall in the value of sterling that immediately followed the Brexit vote should have 
boosted manufacturing exports, but UK manufacturing is now heavily dependent on the 
import of components due to ‘broken’ domestic supply chains (Pike et al, 2012: 32-34) – 
something which particularly muddies the ostensible post-crisis success story of car 
manufacturing in the North East, which is reliant on both finance and components from Japan 
(Berry, 2015a: 183). Crucially, even if the UK were to negotiate entry into the European 
Economic Area along the lines of Norway – which at the time of writing is far from certain – 
it would not be part of the EU’s customs union, meaning that ‘rules of origin’ provisions 
would apply. Goods that the UK exports to the EU would have to be substantially composed 
of content produced domestically, or indeed within the EU itself, to qualify for tariff-free 
single market access (Piris, 2016: 8). 
 
Devolution and the Northern Powerhouse in the British industrial policy tradition 
 
Industrial policy in the UK 
 
Any exploration of manufacturing decline requires an understanding of the UK’s industrial 
policy tradition, not least because the line between industrial and regional policy in the UK 
has always been a blurry one. By conflating a desired industrial renaissance with an agenda 
around local government reform, the Northern Powerhouse agenda arguably served to 
intensify this inheritance. Industrial policy involves the state deliberately favouring 
manufacturing industries over others, irrespective of market signals. Essentially, through 
industrial policy the state intervenes ‘vertically’ in parts of the economy in order to ensure 
that private economic actors are properly incentivised to pursue the public good of enhanced 
productivity (for the benefit of the entire economy). This definition is of course a contested 
one – and the contest has a direct bearing upon the British industrial policy tradition. UK 
policy-makers would generally claim that Britain has long upheld a functional industrial 
policy regime, albeit one that operates ‘horizontally’ to improve the general environment for 
all business activity, rather than vertically in support of manufacturing and related industries. 
This chapter is based on the assumption that industrial policy, by definition, has to be vertical 
in nature. Yet this debate is of little consequence for our present purposes. It is more 
important to note that manufacturing benefits most, by design, from vertical industrial policy. 
That the UK favours a horizontal approach signals the British state’s longstanding 
indifference to manufacturing (and by extension, the regions most reliant on manufacturing 
industries) (Berry, 2017). 
As such, direct support for manufacturers has generally taken the form of ‘soft’ 
interventions such as advice services and the dissemination of best practice and tax 
allowances for R&D or capital investment (Buigues and Sekkat, 2009). It should be noted 
that in the 1970s, Harold Wilson’s Labour government introduced a more interventionist 
approach, involving direct subsidies and planning agreements, although the agenda became 
largely focused on defensive interventions to rescue unproductive firms and industries 
(Coates, 2015). The 2008 crisis, however, appeared to reignite an interest among policy elites 
in industrial policy, and indeed seemed to endorse vertical interventions in support of 
manufacturing, insofar as the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition promised to 
‘rebalance’ the economy from finance (or services in general) towards manufacturing, and 
from London and the South East (or the South in general) towards the North. This narrative 
had already been present to some extent in the Labour government’s post-2008 agenda – as 
represented in the New Industry, New Jobs (HM Government, 2009) strategy – but it was 
only from 2010 onwards that more explicit references to the geographical dimension of 
supporting manufacturing through industrial policy firmly re-entered the lexicon of the UK 
policy elite. The 2010 coalition agreement stated that: 
 
We want to create a fairer and more balanced economy, where we are not so dependent 
on a narrow range of economic sectors, and where new businesses and economic 
opportunities are more evenly shared between regions and industries (HM Government, 
2010: 9). 
 
An accompanying speech by new Prime Minister, David Cameron (2010) argued that ‘our 
economy has become more and more unbalanced, with our fortunes hitched to a few 
industries in one corner of the country, while we let other sectors like manufacturing slide’, 
and in 2011 the coalition’s ‘plan for growth’ repeated:  
 
Sustainable growth requires a rebalancing of the UK economy away from a reliance on 
a narrow range of sectors and regions, to one built on investment and exports, with 
strong growth more fairly shared across the UK (HM Treasury and Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011: 28). 
 
The ‘plan for growth’ was of course launched by George Osborne’s now infamous ‘march of 
the makers’ speech (Osborne, 2011). But what kind of policies were actually associated with 
this agenda? Access to finance – primarily a horizontal issue, focused on small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in general rather than any particular industry – has been a core 
concern. The government has issued loan guarantees that could amount to around £2 billion, 
in addition to the Bank of England’s Funding for Lending scheme, although this scheme was 
initially used predominantly to support mortgage lending. The British Business Bank enabled 
a more direct form of lending to SMEs, albeit with funds of only around £1.5 billion. Other 
measures focused on SMEs include better targeting of government procurement, increased 
apprenticeship funding, and tax and planning incentives within ‘enterprise zones’. There were 
more vertical forms of support for manufacturing industries. Perhaps what is most interesting, 
however, is that policy-makers (especially elected politicians) were content to create the 
impression that industrial policy was being targeted on particular, strategically significant 
industries; for example, in the coalition’s 2012 industrial strategy, outlining the eleven key 
sectors as the focus of government action (many of which were manufacturing and related 
industries) (HM Government 2014). Yet arguments in ‘the plan for growth’ that might 
support a more interventionist industrial policy run alongside support for fiscal conservatism, 
lower taxes and deregulation, and flexible labour markets (albeit with a higher-skilled 
workforce). This might help to explain the conservatism of the government’s agenda in this 
regard. The creation of a series of ‘catapult centres’ related to particular sectors or industries 
was probably the most significant policy, although the centres were not all entirely new. The 
centres enable firms and universities to collaborate on R&D and access common, publicly-
funded resources (they are expected to become profitable and attract private funding in the 
medium-term). The Advanced Manufacturing Supply Chain Initiative (at a cost of around 
£240 million) is also worth noting, as is the coalition’s extension of tax allowances related to 
capital investment, which primarily benefit manufacturers. 
Vince Cable, Liberal Democrat MP and Business Secretary within the coalition 
government, clearly wanted to have gone further, especially in terms of advanced 
manufacturing. He openly criticised the government’s ‘piecemeal’ approach to industrial 
policy, and argued that greater state intervention was legitimate and necessary, because 
public investment was more efficient than private investment from the perspective of 
boosting productive capacity over the long term (Cable, 2011; 2012). He enjoyed support 
from both the Confederation of British Industry and the Trades Union Congress for his 
position, as well as his departmental colleague, science minister and Conservative MP, David 
Willets (see Willets, 2012). But we must not exaggerate Cable’s radicalism in this regard. 
Indeed, in ‘sector analysis’ published by his department in 2012, it was stressed that 
‘[h]orizontal policies, such as setting the legal and regulatory frameworks in which 
businesses across the economy operate, form the bedrock of industrial strategy’. The 
momentum behind the coalition’s industrial strategy appeared to have waned significantly by 
2015, before disappearing in all but name following the Conservative Party’s 2015 general 
election victory (Berry, 2017). Intriguingly, during Theresa May’s campaign for the 
Conservative Party leadership, after the Brexit vote, she signalled her support for a ‘proper 
industrial strategy’ and ‘economic reform’, echoing remarks from 2013 in favour of ‘a more 
strategic role for the state in our economy’ (May, 2013; 2016c). However, there are as yet 
few genuine signs that she intends to transform UK industrial policy (Berry, 2017). 
Furthermore, insofar as May’s words can be taken at face value, she appears less keen than 
her former colleagues in the Conservative Party to explicitly associate industrial strategy with 
support for either manufacturing or Northern England. 
 
Regional policy and the emergence of the Northern Powerhouse 
 
In recent decades, regional policy has in the UK effectively functioned as industrial policy by 
proxy – and it was at the regional level that the state apparatus appeared during this period to 
take on a more interventionist or vertical pose. This applied most to the New Labour era, with 
the Blair government clearly more inclined to take an interest in its depressed ‘heartland’ 
constitutions in the North, but it was also, to a lesser extent, a feature of the Thatcher and 
especially Major governments’ agenda. This was again often limited, however, to defensive 
moves, in recognition of the particular economic geography of hardships associated with 
deindustrialisation. In general, the regional layer simply replicated the horizontal approach of 
national government, and indeed probably reinforced it, by encouraging all regions to pursue 
similar economic objectives, often in competition with each other and paradoxically with 
little sense that strategies were genuinely ‘place-based’ (Bailey & Driffield, 2007; Bailey et 
al, 2015). As suggested above, one of the interesting paradoxes of post-crisis industrial policy 
in the UK is that those most in favour of a more vertical approach at the national level seem 
least concerned about the geographical dimension to supporting manufacturing. Vince Cable, 
for instance, appears not to have bought into Northern Powerhouse to any extent, despite the 
fact that his party leader, then Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, arguably initiated the 
coalition’s interest in this area, albeit in a rather nebulous manner through his Northern 
Futures initiative. Incredibly, among Cable’s flagship catapult centres, only two of eleven 
current centres have a Northern footprint: the medicines discovery centre is based in 
Cheshire, and the high-value manufacturing centre has seven bases, one of which is in 
Redcar, with a further two in Rotherham (connected to the University of Sheffield).  
Shortly before becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May appeared to signal that her 
government would not champion the North above other areas, arguing that she would initiate 
‘a plan to help not one or even two of our great regional cities, but every single one of them’ 
(May, 2016c). This implied rebuke to Osborne’s focus on the North has subsequently 
softened, although it is probably significant that she first resuscitated the Northern 
Powerhouse moniker when speaking directly to a Northern audience, writing in The 
Yorkshire Post that ‘Yorkshire is a key part of our vision for a Northern Powerhouse – our 
plan to help the great cities and towns of the North pool their strengths and take on the world’ 
(May, 2016a). The Northern Powerhouse is perhaps understood by May as a policy agenda 
(or branding) relevant to the North, but not necessarily the UK economy in general. 
Comically, a similar article endorsing ‘the Midlands Engine’ (a later Osborne concoction) 
appeared in The Birmingham Mail on the same day (May, 2016b). Ultimately, of course, the 
fact that politicians such as George Osborne (who represents a constituency in Cheshire) 
were keen to promulgate the idea of a Northern manufacturing revival does not mean they 
upheld a more genuinely place-based approach to industrial policy than espoused now by 
Theresa May. The memoirs of former Liberal Democrat minister David Laws revealed that, 
after Clegg lobbied Osborne to include Sheffield (where Clegg’s constituency is) rather than 
Leeds in the first wave of announcements related to the Northern Powerhouse, Clegg told 
him that ‘George is hilarious. He immediately suggested including Sheffield and just 
dropping Leeds’ (cited in Chakrabortty, 2016). 
The coalition government’s interest in local growth started somewhat inauspiciously when 
it abolished Labour’s Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) immediately after coming to 
office. RDAs were New Labour’s attempt to revolutionise the governance of local economic 
development in England, using central government budgets more effectively to support new 
and growing industries, not least to enable post-industrial transition and engender more 
balanced growth. While Scotland and Wales began the path to political and constitutional 
devolution in Labour’s first term, RDAs were explicitly designed as arms-length, apolitical 
bodies (the Labour government quickly aborted half-hearted efforts democratise regional 
policy in England during its second term following a referendum defeat in the North East). 
Defined by their regional location rather than any particular vision for industrial policy, there 
were few natural limits to the scope of their responsibilities. The resources, of course, seldom 
matched the policy ambition. While many RDAs lobbied for further devolution, for others it 
was rather unwelcome. Transplanted on top of a historically messy governance hierarchy in 
England, RDAs ultimately became a new institutional repository for the mess (although this 
does not mean they were entirely unsuccessful, judged on their own terms). Although RDAs 
were pitched by Labour as the solution to the malaise of deindustrialisation, they were largely 
place-blind in practice, arguably more so than the minimal regional economic development 
structures created by the Conservatives in the 1980s and early 1990s (although they were less 
explicitly market-oriented). Every part of England was covered by an RDA, including 
London, in contrast to the European norm of focusing regional policy initiatives on the areas 
most in need (Pike et al, 2016a; Pike & Tomaney, 2009). 
RDAs were replaced by Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), semi-autonomous bodies, 
organised loosely on a city-regional basis, led by representatives of both local government 
and local business communities working in partnership. It is worth noting that RDAs had 
themselves become more local or city-based over time, particularly during Labour’s third 
term when they were instructed to deliver interventions via local authorities as far as possible, 
and (unelected) regional supervisory chambers were abolished (Pike et al, 2016). LEPs were 
established by central government, but were given miniscule resources to fund a small core 
staff and organisational administration. LEPs do not themselves invest, but are expected to 
encourage investment by public and private actors in self-defined priority areas. LEPs hold 
few, if any, actual policy powers. While conceived as an attempt to instil a genuinely 
(business-defined) localism, LEPs’ lack of power and resources is compounded by the 
problem of multiple and blurred lines of accountability (enabling reinvented forms of 
centralisation), gerrymandered and overlapping political boundaries, and a constitutive 
inability to address market failure (Jones, 2013; Pike et al, 2015).  
The non-statutory and unincorporated nature of LEPs means the initiative has functioned 
in parallel with, but only loosely connected to (limited) funding streams for local economic 
development, such as the Regional Growth Fund (RGF; a £2.4 billion pot for regeneration 
projects, available from 2011 to 2015). Many LEPs controlled some RGF funds designed for 
very small projects, but most of the RGF is administered by central government, with LEPs 
required to work with local firms to apply to the centre. The devolution of power to local 
government encapsulated by ‘city deals’ has also been organised in parallel with LEPs. City 
deals are the mechanism through which central government has sought to devolve powers to 
combined authorities (consortia of local authorities, typically organised on a city-regional 
basis). City deals have to date also focused rather too much on devolving the responsibility to 
deliver national policy, rather than the responsibility to decide on how best to support local 
economies. The most significant move towards decentralisation to date involves Greater 
Manchester taking control of the region’s health and social care budgets. However, ‘at the 
moment, “devo-health” is more akin to delegation than devolution’ (Quilter-Pinner, 2016: 1). 
Furthermore, and more significantly, very few economic policy powers being devolved to 
Northern local authorities constitute a meaningful opportunity to develop industrial policy at 
the local level. Many local authorities are likely to end up with some new powers over 
transport, although generally not powers to decide on major infrastructure projects. Some 
planning powers and housing budgets will be devolved, alongside some aspects of central 
government’s training, skills, employment support and business support services – with all 
recent and future spending cuts devolved too. Limited central government budgets for direct 
investment in productive activity will remain exactly where they are. And too often, delivery 
powers require local authorities to outsource the actual administration of, for example, 
employment support programmes, relying on many of the same firms hitherto contracted by 
central government (Berry, 2016a: 42-43). It is revealing that the Treasury has been almost 
solely responsible for the devolution agenda within central government; this has led to a deal-
making process typical of Treasury statecraft (see the chapter by Lee in this volume for a 
longer discussion of the Treasury). Tellingly, the announcement of new or updated city deals 
is often accompanied by announcements around new investment in infrastructure or 
regeneration – yet these initiatives typically remain under central government’s control. 
It would be interesting at this point to note the contribution of veteran Conservative 
cabinet minister (and rival to Margaret Thatcher), Michael Heseltine, to coalition thinking 
around local growth and industrial policy. Heseltine’s 2012 report No Stone Unturned in 
Pursuit of Growth, commissioned – but not necessarily enthusiastically – by George Osborne, 
offered a fairly lavish vision for the state in co-ordinating an economy-wide growth plan, 
joining up all both national and local government, and public and private sector, initiatives to 
improve UK productivity and competitiveness Heseltine, 2012). His key recommendation 
was that all public spending relevant to economic growth (he identified around £50 billion in 
relevant spending per year) should be devolved. More precisely, he recommended that this 
expenditure should be amalgamated into a single fund, enabling LEPs to apply to central 
government for access to these funds. As such, Heseltine offered a somewhat surreal 
approach, with little grounding in how central government budgets actually function, or 
indeed any understanding of how LEPs operate in practice. Nevertheless, while Osborne 
rejected the notion of devolving budgets on this scale to local government in any form, we 
can trace similarities in the sentiments of both men, insofar as Osborne viewed the city deal 
process as one in which local government could be refashioned in the image of Heseltine, 
with local authorities themselves becoming more LEP-like, seeking primarily to attract 
exogenous investment rather than playing a meaningful role in governing the local economy. 
Heseltine may support a stronger role for the state, but it is nevertheless a technocratic, 
depoliticised state. 
Interestingly, No Stone Unturned includes very few references to manufacturing, or any 
particular manufacturing industry. Manufacturing may have resurfaced in the Conservative 
approach to localised industrial policy, but perhaps only as something that local government 
must itself find ways of supporting, without a substantive strategy at the national level. In the 
Conservative approach, cities, rather than industries or governments, are the new agents of 
economic history, but only insofar as cities are conceived as the ideal incubator of market 
dynamics. This approach is heavily influenced by the ‘new urban economics’ and ‘new 
economic geography’, forms of spatial economics drawing substantially upon neoclassical 
theory, which emphasise urban ‘agglomeration’ as a more perfect form of market dynamics, 
creating sustainable economic equilibria – and explaining disequilibrium with reference to 
public interventions to protect unecomonic forms or spatial organisation (Engelen et al, 2016; 
Martin, 2015; Martin et al, 2015; see also the chapters by Martin and Gardiner, and Gray, 
Dickinson and Pugalis in this volume) (These perspectives had of course influenced New 
Labour’s approach to regional governance, and the evolution of the RDAs (Pike at el, 2016).) 
There is even a catapult centre devoted to ‘future cities’ (based in London) which, apparently, 
‘accelerate[s] urban ideas to market, to grow the economy and make cities better’ (Future 
Cities Catapult, 2016).  
In Heseltine’s vision, the fixation on cities equates to enriching business-led LEPs. For 
Osborne, far more attuned to the intricacies of political power and symbolism, it equates to 
the establishment of so-called ‘metro-mayors’, directly-elected to oversee combined 
authorities within city-regions. The scope of powers to be allocated to metro-mayors remains 
far from certain – this is seemingly not a primary consideration for national policy-makers – 
beyond chairing existing or new combined authority boards. The Northern Powerhouse 
therefore takes on greatest significance insofar as the North of England is deemed to be home 
to a handful of large cities, whose interests will be promoted by this agenda. The focus on the 
region’s metropolitanism, rather than any other socio-economic characteristics, helps to 
explain the prominence of transport investment and planning rules in growth plans. When the 
Treasury replaced the 2011 growth plan with ‘the productivity plan’, following the 2015 
general election, the associated document Fixing the Foundations listed ‘Resurgent cities, a 
rebalanced economy and a thriving Northern Powerhouse’ as one of the key ambitions 
towards delivering ‘a dynamic economy’, which was identified alongside ‘long term 
investment’ as one of two drivers of national productivity. It is interesting perhaps that there 
were no explicit references to the North in relation to the long term investment driver, and 
that the key ambition in relation to a dynamic economy was labour market deregulation (HM 
Treasury, 2015b). Despite the focus on productivity, Fixing the Foundations does not contain 
a single reference to manufacturing. 
Despite its implicit, yet deliberate, allusion to the UK’s past manufacturing glories, the 
Northern Powerhouse, and its partial embodiment in the city deals process, essentially 
represents a form of ‘bottom-up horizontalism’ within UK industrial policy. While the 
valorisation of city-led growth alludes to the possibility of vertical intervention at the local 
level to support local industries, in actual fact the transposition of responsibility for industrial 
policy to the local level probably serves to dilute even the horizontal forms of intervention 
traditional favoured by UK policy-makers. The Northern Powerhouse is a largely place-blind 
agenda in which cities are asked to improve the attractiveness of their areas to business, but 
not primarily to assist firms in improving their performance once situated within the their 
jurisdiction. The key tax change related to devolution (relevant to all local authorities) fits the 
notion of bottom-up horizontalism well. Amid ongoing city deal negotiations between the 
Treasury and local authorities in 2015, the government announced the wholesale devolution 
of business rates (a tax on the physical footprint of private companies), alongside the phased 
withdrawal of central government grants to local authorities. The move (which is discussed 
by both Bailey, and Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, at greater length in their chapters in this 
volume) is ostensibly designed to enable city-regions to exercise greater control over their 
finances, yet clearly benefits those areas with strong, existing private sector bases, which of 
course already tend to be more affluent than those lacking this characteristic. Moreover, 
while the simultaneous withdrawal of central grants inherently disincentivises local 
authorities from increasing business rates, just to be on the safe side, the government 
prohibited increases at the local level without the prior approval the private sector appointees 
on the relevant LEP board, and even then increases must take the form of a capped surcharge 
to fund a specific, local infrastructure project (HM Treasury, 2015a). 
 
The de-development of Northern England 
 
Development and unevenness 
 
As intimated above, the North or the manufacturing industries located within Northern 
regions cannot be understood in isolation, from either the rest of the UK or the global 
economy. The notion of ‘uneven development’ has become increasingly important to 
critically-minded social scientists interested in the fortunes of areas like the North of 
England. The concept implies not simply that different areas have different levels of 
affluence (or are at different stages of development) but, furthermore, that the economic 
experience of different areas are related and in interaction with each other (Peck and 
Theodore, 2007).  In this vein, Ron Martin (2015) challenges regional studies to adopt both a 
‘total national system’ framework (in which scholars assess ‘a nation-wide evolving pattern 
of combined and uneven geographical development, set in the context of that national 
economy’s changing external linkages and interactions and its evolving internal institutional 
and political structures’) and a ‘total place’ framework (assessing a ‘region’s or city’s 
economy in all its multi-scalar detail, as a complex open system set within the relevant 
national and international networks and structures to which it relates and with which in 
interacts’) (Hudson, 2015: 262-263). Accordingly, Martin finds little evidence that efforts to 
rebalance the UK economy towards the North and manufacturing are transformative of the 
basic structures and relationships upheld at the national level, and supported internationally, 
which provide for uneven development within the UK economy (2015: 264). 
The links between seemingly local development projects is central to Ray Hudson and 
Dan Swanton’s (2012) report on the fascinating case of the decline in steel production in both 
Teesside and Dortmund, Germany, alongside the simultaneous expansion of production in 
China. Somewhat remarkably, after ending production in Dortmund, German steel producer 
ThyssenKrupp dismantled the bulk of the relevant steelworks, and sold and shipped it to a 
Chinese producer for reassembly in Jiangsu Province. In contrast, the British equivalent had 
little resale value given the lack of investment in modernisation. While steelmaking capacity 
was therefore retained in the North temporarily, with the plant eventually reopened under the 
ownership of Indian conglomerate Tata (to service, primarily, Indian demand) paradoxically 
this put the UK in competition with Chinese producers, with little evidence of capacity within 
the UK to develop more advanced production techniques (domestic steel demand in the UK, 
in areas such as defence and transport infrastructure, is generally met through imports). The 
recent turmoil around the likely closure of the Tata plant in Teesside, due in part to price 
manipulation by the Chinese government (which the UK government sought to prevent 
European authorities challenging – signifying that the UK policy elite is probably more 
concerned with the country’s political and economic relations with China than prosperity in 
the North) is as predictable as it is devastating for those directly affected. While Dortmund 
has evolved into an important urban economy within the global, post-industrial core, 
benefiting from high-value manufacturing activity in neighbouring cities, Teesside, largely 
isolated from post-industrial prosperity in some Northern cities, has become increasingly 
vulnerable to shifting hierarchies within global production networks. 
As important as this literature (spanning regional studies and economic geography) is, it 
probably takes for granted too readily what it means for an economy to develop or become 
‘more developed’. Recognising that development is an uneven process, and that processes 
such as deindustrialisation create new hardships, is not quite the same as arguing that 
deindustrialisation may actually represent a form of ‘de-development’. There remains a 
strong sense in UK public discourse (and within parts of the academic community) that post-
industrialism represents a ‘higher’ stage of economic development (see Davis, 2011; Kay, 
2016). Two sets of responses to this are possible. The first concerns the role, noted above, of 
a strong manufacturing sector in the prospects for sustainable growth, and particularly 
productivity improvements. Manufacturing is the motor of innovation, and acts to support 
and propel other sectors in an infinite number of ways (Chang, 2014; Pike et al, 2012). Of 
course, in theory the North need not necessarily itself house a large manufacturing sector in 
order to benefit from the fruits of manufacturing – and nor can we assume that, even if it 
were able to revive its manufacturing base, the North would necessarily capture the bulk of 
the benefits, or indeed create large numbers of new manufacturing jobs. However, the more 
salient point is that manufacturing matters to more than elite discourses tend to recognise, and 
that by building upon its traditional strength in manufacturing, the North will be able to more 
effectively control its own destiny. 
A second set of related responses, best represented in the critical international political 
economy literature, concerns a complementary narrowing and broadening of the notion of 
development, enabled by distinguishing clearly between development and (capitalist) growth. 
Accordingly, the notion that development must take a particular economic form is eschewed, 
with the development concept redeployed more narrowly in terms of a development ‘model’ 
which crystallises a particular approach to securing growth (and which may be a flawed 
approach, or partial to the interests of some groups over others). At the same time, this 
literature shows that all (political) economies are constantly ‘developing’ in a broader sense. 
Development is not a process with an end-point, but rather a way describing multi-
dimensional processes of economic change. From this perspective, what is most important to 
understand is whether a given polity is able to exercise meaningful control over these 
processes (Bishop, 2016; Payne, 2005; Payne & Phillips, 2009). Although this perspective 
has to date been largely agnostic about manufacturing, and is concerned mainly with national 
economies (and the relationships between them) rather than local economies, its application 
to the North does not require too great an intellectual leap. Irrespective of the centrality of 
manufacturing to sustainable growth in general terms, the North’s particular experience of 
deindustrialisation has been accompanied by a decentring of Northern regions from the UK’s 
prevailing development model (in narrow terms), but also, relatedly, the increased 
vulnerability of development processes (in broad terms) within the North to exogenous 
forces. 
 
De-development in the Northern periphery? 
 
The question of whether the North is in fact de-developing may therefore offer an important 
framing for future research. This concept has a relatively limited genealogy in social science. 
It has been applied in a fairly conventional manner – with de-development understood as a 
reversal of upward trends in quantitative indicators of improvements in living standards and 
economic growth – to countries transitioning to liberal democracy following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union (Meurs & Ranasinghe, 2013). More prominently, and more interestingly, it 
has been applied to the case of Palestine, following Sara Roy’s work on the economy of the 
Gaza Strip, which showed that Gaza was de-developing despite having experienced relatively 
strong output growth since the 1960s, because Israeli rule ‘weakens the ability of [Gaza’s] 
economy to grow and expand by preventing it from accessing and utilizing critical inputs 
needed to promote internal growth beyond a specific structural level’ (Roy, 1987). Eventual 
economic collapse in Palestine perhaps vindicates Roy’s view – that this collapse was a 
consequence of Israel security policy, rather than any economic weakness, strengthens rather 
than undermines this point, assuming we accept the broader understanding of development 
suggested above. Foreign aid now sustains the Palestinian economy, but in a way, argues 
Hani Mahmoud (2014), that also reinforces de-development. The concept has even been 
applied recently to the UK, in a polemical book by economics journalists Larry Elliott and 
Dan Atkinson (2012) on what they see as the imminent absolute decline of the UK economy, 
compounding post-war relative decline. The loss of UK manufacturing features heavily in 
Elliott and Atkinson’s account, although they frustratingly understand development in rather 
crude terms, insofar as they see the de-development process as one in which the UK will start 
to resemble ‘a third world economy’. This is clearly an over-statement, and probably misses 
the real significance of what might be happening in different parts of the UK. Northern 
England is clearly not becoming what would be understood in conventional parlance as an 
under-developed economy, but it may be losing what power it has over its own fate. That this 
might not apply uniformly to the North is a rather mundane inevitability, but could also 
underline the fact that in order to achieve growth, Northern cities and/or regions must 
compete with each other for the favour of external entities. 
Agglomeration-based dogma about the importance of cities reinforces this situation, 
insofar as it reduces the Northern economic space to a set of discrete urban centres 
(legitimising their political separation at the same as stronger transport links between 
Northern cities are advocated). This is of course not to suggest that the North can only 
develop qua the North, or that cities are economically insignificant. The first section of this 
chapter endorsed the view that some (post-industrial) cities are to some extent transcending 
national borders to form a new global economic core. The question is whether an economic 
strategy which privileges urban centres (including, furthermore, the North’s relatively 
miniscule urban centres) is likely to benefit the Northern economy. This is a particularly 
important issue given that it is a strategy which also underpins the process of devolution to 
the North. Calvin Jones’ (2015) response to Ron Martin’s challenge to regional studies 
advocates a world-systems approach to studying local and regional economic development, 
following the approach to international relations and the global economic order developed by 
Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein understood the global political economy in terms of core 
and peripheral (and semi-peripheral) nation-states, with variable levels of development across 
the world not simply transitory, but rather a structural product of the governance of the global 
order by core countries. Jones seeks to introduce this approach to the study of uneven 
development within countries, which he sees in parallel to, and in part a function of, global 
unevenness. Crucially, it is within countries that we can see more precisely how complex 
circuits of capital are shaped by institutions of political governance external to the economic 
spaces in question – Jones argues this is central to understanding the uneven spatiality of 
capitalist organisation (Jones, 2015; see also Engelen et al, 2016). 
The lesson, perhaps, is that the North has to be understood as a peripheral part of the 
British economy (we can speculate that it occupies a semi-peripheral status within the global 
economy, despite its location within a traditional core economy), notwithstanding the 
possibility that some parts of the North are more peripheral than others, and that other parts 
of the UK may belong in the same category. Simply trying to replicate in the North what has 
(apparently) enabled London – and other Southern cities, to a lesser extent – to proper within 
an emerging global core of transnational cities may be a fallacious strategy. Moreover, 
because the cities-based strategy is a product of the same national-level governance 
procedures that act to sustain unevenness within the UK, it may be that the privileging of the 
larger Northern cities, at the expense of Northern regions as a whole, enables them to prosper 
as satellite cities of the transnational core, without challenging the structures that ultimately 
underline their subservience. As such, the North’s recent successes tend to be built upon the 
location of regional outposts of London-centred financial and business service industries 
within city-centres, coupled with the coterminous expansion of retail, leisure and hospitality 
industries. The conflation of industrial and regional policy characterised here as bottom-up 
horizontalism allows for a degree of prosperity among the strongest post-industrial cities, but 
not for large-scale upgrades in manufacturing capacity, nor for any systematic strategy to 
address inequality. Moreover, while some parts of the North may be growing, this does not 
mean they are not stuck in the same de-development trap, because their prosperity depends 
on the persistence of political-economic structures within which the North is inherently 
subservient. The ongoing failure of the North to systematically renew its manufacturing 
capacity illustrates well that the North lacks the authority to adopt a development model 
which builds upon its own endogenous strength in manufacturing – reinforced by a focus of 
regeneration initiatives on city centres at the expense of the range of geographies in which 
contemporary, high-value production might actually be located.  
Even the apparent exceptions to this trend (no historical process is unidirectional) are quite 
revealing. Sheffield city-region, for instance, has been successful in retaining and reviving 
some high-value dimensions of engineering related to steel production, albeit with only a 
limited role for native (or even British) enterprises. Similarly, the discovery of ‘miracle 
material’ graphene in Manchester has not led to the establishment of new graphene-based 
industries in the local economy on any significant scale, in part due to the UK’s broken high-
value manufacturing supply chains (Institute of Mechanical Engineers, 2013; Froud et al, 
2011) – the graphene experience is at the time of writing subject to an inquiry by the science 
and technology select committee in the UK parliament. Furthermore, the relocation of old 
manufacturing industries, such as car manufacturing, to parts of the North East where it had 
not traditionally been strong is consistently lauded as a rebalancing success story, yet it is 
paradoxically only possible because deindustrialisation in the North East has made its 
economy more amenable to lower-skill assembly processes. (And there are already signs that 
Brexit problematises this arrangement in disrupting the business model of foreign producers 
based in the North.)  No parts of the North can be said to have been successful in developing 
industries connected to computers and consumer electronics. The focus of post-crisis 
industrial policy on supporting science and R&D may, or may not, be the correct focus for 
the UK economy as a whole, but even if this were the case, we can conclude that few parts of 
the North are in a position to take advantage of the new resources associated with this 
strategy (an issue further explored in Kieron Flanagan and James Wilsdon’s contribution to 
this volume).  
A 2016 report by think-tank Centre for Cities, comparing UK cities with European 
counterparts across a wide range of economic indicators, underlines the problems facing the 
cities of the North, as they have fallen significantly below the European average in terms of 
productivity, in a domestic economy more dominated by its capital city than any comparable 
country. The report implicitly underlines the peripheral nature of the North in international 
terms. Interestingly, the report also notes that successful German cities appear to be 
accounted for not by any particular industrial composition, but rather the co-location of cities 
with varying industrial strengths – including several medium-sized cities where output is 
dominated by manufacturing – within the same administrative region. The intellectual 
barriers to addressing the North’s developmental dilemmas are evident, however, in the fact 
that the report’s conclusions appear to ignore its own evidence. The report simply (and 
glibly) instead presses for the UK’s underperforming cities to simply focus on attracting 
foreign investment into knowledge-based industries, and invest in transport links to ‘better 
link jobs in city centres… to residential areas in suburbs and hinterlands’ (Bessis, 2016: 23-
24). Even among the most vociferous advocates and students of local economic development, 
concerns that the North’s development cannot simply replicate London and other Southern 
cities, and indeed that the North’s developmental interests might conflict with the wider UK 
developmental model, are thoroughly marginalised. 
Too often, such analysis presents cities, domestically and internationally, as either in 
competition with each other, or at the very least relatively isolated from each other 
economically. In practice, and quite obviously, city economies are highly integrated across 
transnational networks. As noted above, withdrawal from the EU is likely to make a 
manufacturing revival in the North more difficult, if not impossible. One of the few 
prominent academic economists who supported the leave campaign, Patrick Minford, argued 
in The Sun that Brexit would ‘eliminate’ manufacturing in the UK over the long term. He 
added, however, that ‘this should not scare us… It is time for Britain to focus on our services 
and design skills, to start producing more of what we’re good at’ (Minford, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the North voted decisively to leave in the referendum of 23 June 2016 (by 56 to 
44 per cent, compared to the national result of 52 to 48 per cent). There is insufficient space 
here to explore why Northerners voted the way they did, and we of course cannot be certain 
what the very long term implications for manufacturing will be, not least because the 
remaining EU continues to struggle with several existential challenges. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to speculate that the North’s support for Brexit is related to its de-development 
dilemma. Encased in a development model in which it is inherently subservient, and 
becoming increasingly stratified, many Northerners took the opportunity to register their 
opposition to the UK status quo, even though the implications are highly likely to cause 
further hardship in the North, and undermine the case for a more vertical, place-based 
industrial policy. (This is not to discount the influence of anti-immigration sentiment within 
the North – but we should not assume that this sentiment can be satisfactorily disentangled 




The Northern Powerhouse agenda epitomises many of the challenges facing Northern 
England, summarised here with reference to three very dangerous Ds: deindustrialisation, 
devolution and de-development. The chapter’s most provocative suggestion is of course that 
the North may be de-developing or, more precisely, stuck in a de-development trap. Yet we 
need not accept the efficacy of this term in full in order to recognise the bevy of development 
dilemmas it seeks to crystallise conceptually. All economies are of course always 
‘developing’, that is, experiencing overlapping, multi-dimensional and contradictory 
processes of development. The problem, firstly, is that development in the North is largely 
governed under the rubric of a UK development model within which the interests of Northern 
regions are marginal. Secondly, the North is seemingly unable to establish an endogenous 
approach to achieving prosperity without further entrenching its subservience to this London-
centred model and/or acquiescing to the deepening of inequalities within the North. The 
North may arguably have been more central in the past to the UK development model, and 
indeed part of the global economic core, but it is now firmly peripheral within the UK 
economy, and semi-peripheral, at best, in a global economic order within which London and 
its hinterland is the only British representative in the core. 
The ongoing stutters of UK manufacturing illustrate the North’s status well. A substantive 
revival of manufacturing in the North would empower the North, but given the longstanding 
indifference to manufacturing among the UK policy elite, the North would require more 
power to shape the UK economy in order to bring such a revival about. There should be no 
suggestion that a manufacturing revival would directly create a large number of new jobs in 
the North, given technological change within the sector, yet the fact that the productivity/jobs 
trade-off barely registers within public discourses around manufacturing demonstrates the 
extent of elite indifference to the North’s economic prospects. It is not necessary to 
adjudicate here on whether the coalition and Conservative governments have genuinely 
sought to revive UK manufacturing, as the discourse around rebalancing and the Northern 
Powerhouse would suggest, since the financial crisis. The more salient point is that, even if 
this were the case, it was always very unlikely to have been achieved without seriously 
challenging the UK’s industrial policy traditions. There are no firm reasons to believe that the 
May government intends to initiate this challenge, despite rediscovering the coalition’s early 
rhetoric around industrial strategy. The notion that the North may become a ‘powerhouse’ of 
course explicitly invokes the North’s historical prowess in manufacturing, but in a rather 
infantilising way. A sustainable manufacturing revival requires a holistic approach to 
economic development (and its political foundations) in places such as Northern England; 
simply reducing the (prospective) Northern economy to its industrial past will paradoxically 
inhibit the restoration of this supposedly glorious past. As it stands, the process of devolution 
to English city-regions – the main policy dimension of the Northern Powerhouse agenda – 
reinforces rather than challenges the UK’s industrial policy orientation, offering little more 
than ‘bottom-up horizontalism’. Devolution is an attempt by national politicians to address 
evident post-crisis concerns around place, identity and local control among the electorate, yet 
in dividing places like the North politically into city-regions, arguably the process will serve 
to reduce the control that Northern citizens exercise over their local economies (Berry, 
2016b). 
However, there are some grounds for optimism for the North. While the Northern 
Powerhouse and plans for devolution might have been devised as a way to modify rather than 
transform the UK’s pre-crisis development model, the fact that associated discourses 
explicitly recognise, albeit partially, the value of the North and the manufacturing sector to 
the UK economy may over time prove to be a significant political opening. Clearly, the UK 
economy, even if it is technically recovering, is struggling to resume the path of stable 
growth. And crucially, while Brexit will in all likelihood prove to be a self-inflicted wound 
for the North, not least due to the negative implications for manufacturing industries, 
London’s finance-led economy may also be significantly impeded by the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU. It is not inconceivable that a more significant rupture in the UK’s pre-crisis 
economic order will occur, enabling an enhanced role for the North in national prosperity. At 
the moment, however, civic leaders in the North generally remain wedded to George 
Osborne’s vision for local growth, while national leaders of the Labour Party and the trade 
unions – organisations through which the North is normally represented in national politics – 
appear not to be focused on the North’s specific development dilemmas. The fact that these 
two groups of leaders have become effectively estranged in recent years may help to explain 
the inadequacies of each group’s strategies for Northern development. That said, the 
establishment of metro-mayors may ironically provide a platform for both reconciliation and 
radicalism in Northern politics – as long as the new mayors’ agenda involves the 
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